Transnational Culture Wars by McCrudden, Christopher
Transnational Culture Wars
McCrudden, C. (2015). Transnational Culture Wars. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 13(2), 434-462.
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mov018
Published in:
International Journal of Constitutional Law
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2015 the author.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in International Journal of Constitutional Law following
peer review. The version of record is available online at: http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/2/434
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589542 
[Forthcoming in I.CON – the International Journal of Constitutional Law] 
Transnational culture wars 
Christopher McCrudden* 
The well-known “culture wars” clash in the United States between civil society actors has now 
gone transnational. Political science scholarship has long detailed how liberal human rights 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engage in extensive national and transnational activity 
in support of their ideals. More recently, US conservative groups (including faith-based NGOs) 
have begun to emulate these strategies, in particular promoting their convictions by engaging in 
transnational advocacy. NGOs thus face off against each other politically across the globe. Less 
well known is the extent to which these culture wars are conducted in courts, using conflicting 
interpretations of human rights law. Many of the same protagonists, particularly NGOs that find 
themselves against each other in US courts, now find new litigation opportunities abroad in 
which to fight their battles. These developments, and their implications, are the focus of this 
article. In particular, the extent to which US faith-based NGOs have leveraged the experience 
gained transnationally to use international and foreign jurisprudence in interventions before the 
US Supreme Court is assessed. 
1. Introduction
The assumption, common some years ago, that Western liberal democracies had solved the 
problem of the relationship between state and religion, with constitutional secularism as a main 
plank of the solution,1 now seems somewhat naïve and precipitous, akin to confident declarations 
of the “end of history.”2 Similarly, the days when the relationship between human rights law and 
religion was a quiet backwater, appearing to confirm arguments about the end of religion as a 
serious force in the world, are long gone. Increasingly, conservative religious groups have 
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article was largely written when I was a Fellow at the NYU Law School’s Straus Centre (2013–14), and in receipt of 
a Leverhulme Research Fellowship (2011–14). I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Arnd Bauerkämper, Edwin 
Cameron, Sarah Cleveland, Cole Durham, Ben Jaffe, Harold Koh, Steve Ratner, and Brett Scharffs for invaluable 
advice and/or comments on earlier drafts. I was Junior Counsel in several cases mentioned subsequently in this 
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1 See CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld 
(eds), 2014) 
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appropriated human rights arguments to support their causes.3 Human rights have become a 
central site of normative contestation over the implications of modernity, with both sides 
claiming to interpret human rights in the “right” way. This is possible because of the contested 
nature of human rights standards, and their sources of authority, as well as confusion as to 
whether there is a lexical ordering of the importance of particular human rights compared with 
others. Both sides see themselves as proponents of human rights, often claiming different human 
rights in support of their positions. 
These issues are currently litigated in a range of different jurisdictions. As a result these 
bodies have to grapple with some of the most difficult issues in what has sometimes been 
referred to in the United States as the “culture wars,” borrowing from the German expression for 
the dispute between Bismarck and the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century.4 An important 
feature of these modern culture wars is that they are often waged by civil society organizations, 
as well as by political parties. The United States is now one of the most prominent examples of 
this phenomenon.5 All this is well known, giving rise to a large and expanding academic 
literature documenting the twists and turns of the complex legal and political maneuverings in 
that jurisdiction.6 
This well-known “culture wars” clash in the United States between civil society actors has 
now gone transnational. For some time, legal scholars have discussed how United States 
administrations have periodically sought to place restrictions on funding non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) outside the United States that support abortion.7 More recently, political 
science scholarship has detailed how conservative groups (including faith-based NGOs) promote 
their convictions by engaging in transnational advocacy.8 NGOs thus face off against each other 
politically across the globe. Less well known, however, is the extent to which these transnational 
3 Clifford Bob has referred to this phenomenon as “frame-jacking,” in which one group’s framing of an issue is 
hijacked by the opponent group to serve a contradictory end, CLIFFORD BOB, THE GLOBAL RIGHT WING AND THE 
CLASH OF WORLD POLITICS 29, 30 (2012),  but that is somewhat question-begging. 
4 The term is a translation of the German Kulturkampf, which describes the clash between the first Chancellor of a 
united Germany, Otto von Bismarck and the Catholic Church in the 1870s, see RONALD J. ROSS, THE FAILURE OF
BISMARCK’S KULTURKAMPF: CATHOLICISM AND STATE POWER IN IMPERIAL GERMANY, 1871–1887 (1998).  
5  The term became popular in the United States in the 1990s as a way of describing the clash between 
traditionalist/conservative/religious and liberal/progressive/secular values. For an early use in this context, see 
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE FAMILY, ART, EDUCATION, LAW, AND 
POLITICS IN AMERICA (1992). 
6 For a recent example, see CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2010). 
7 James Gathii, Exporting Culture Wars, 13(1) U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 67 (2006). 
8 See esp., BOB, supra note 3. 
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culture wars are conducted in courts, using human rights law.9 The role that advocacy networks 
and NGOs play as translators, or norm entrepreneurs, in debates about freedom of religion in the 
modern world is my particular focus, but this has implications for debates about the diffusion and 
socializing of human rights norms more generally. 
This article identifies two separate, but closely related, phenomena in litigation with a 
religious dimension: the increased presence of NGOs in such litigation in their own jurisdictions; 
and their increased presence in transnational religious litigation. Many of the same protagonists, 
particularly NGOs, find new litigation opportunities abroad in which to intervene. NGOs are 
increasingly operating on a transnational basis, identifying litigation opportunities to promote 
their ideological positions wherever they occur and this jurisdictional opportunism may carry 
them well outside their own jurisdictions. Both developments involve decisions by religiously 
affiliated NGOs to get into the “intervention game” that more secular NGOs had already made 
their own. Religiously affiliated NGOs are relative latecomers to this game. They are attempting 
to “catch up” with the practices of secular NGOs in their national jurisdictions, and taking 
advantage of globalization to tackle the secularizing effects of modernization in other 
jurisdictions as well.  
The thick description of modern religious litigation to be presented, and in particular the way 
that NGOs now operate in the context of religious litigation, appear to challenge some common 
assumptions in the scholarly analysis of the role that NGOs play in the human rights context. 
This has tended to focus on their role in institutions other than courts, and this focus has led to 
the relative dearth of studies considering the role that NGOs play as norm entrepreneurs in the 
litigation context. This article suggests that NGOs have well understood the power that courts 
have in generating interpretations of existing legal norms that support their policy positions and 
have sought to expand their activities into regional and domestic litigation in order to secure such 
favorable interpretations.10  
NGOs, at least in the religious litigation context, now find themselves increasingly 
confronted by NGOs on the other side, in what becomes a battle of NGOs of different 
ideological persuasions. NGOs have significantly different normative preferences, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 But see id., esp. chs. 3 and 4, and Clifford Bob, The Global Battle over Religious Expression: Sweden’s Ake Green 
Case in Local and Transnational Perspective, 40(2) J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 212 (2014). 
10 See, e.g., the Center for Reproductive Rights, International Legal Program Summary of Strategic Planning 
Through October 31, 2003, repr. in Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks (Dec. 8, 2003), at E2534 (Hon. 
Christopher H. Smith). 
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(unsurprisingly) may end up on different sides of the domestic and international political and 
legal divide. Any assumption that NGOs will necessarily adopt “liberal” or “progressive” 
political orientations seems increasingly questionable. As Bob has observed: “most global issues 
involve not just a single ‘progressive’ movement promoting a cause, but also rivals fighting it.”11 
“Global civil society,” he continues, “is not a harmonious field of like-minded NGOs. It is a 
contentious arena riven by fundamental differences crisscrossing national and international 
boundaries.”12 
The further assumption that transnational civil actors will share the same or similar 
preferences to local NGOs will be shown to be equally questionable. The assumption that 
transnationalization is “a positively enabling process” for local civil society actors, or that 
“transnational network structures are predominantly seen as benefiting the goals and activities of 
domestic, civil society norm entrepreneurs”13 should be taken with a considerable pinch of salt. 
As Stachursky suggests, “domestic civil society actors employing transnational human rights 
discourses, and linguistic repertoires . . . might easily participate in transnational dialogue but 
face opposition and suspicion by other local civil society actors or their local constituencies.”14 
Sally Engle Merry has described how 
Intermediaries such as NGO and social movement activists play a critical role in 
interpreting the cultural world of transnational modernity for local claimants. They 
appropriate, translate, and remake transnational discourses into the vernacular. At the 
same time, they take local stories and frame them in national and international human 
rights language.15 
There is, however, a potentially difficult relationship between the different social actors who 
may have very different understandings of how best (or whether) to translate the vernacular into 
the international, and the international into the vernacular, because these actors may have 
different sources of legitimacy that will be differently affected.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 BOB, supra note 3, at 2. 
12 Id. at 6. 
13 BENJAMIN STACHURSKY, THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF TRANSNATIONALIZATION: NGO ACTIVISM AND THE 
SOCIALIZATION OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN EGYPT AND IRAN 64 (2013). 
14 STACHURSKY, supra note 13, at 74. 
15 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL 
JUSTICE 3 (2006). 
16 Kimerling makes a similar point, see Judith Kimerling, The Story from the Oil Patch: The Under-Represented in 
Aguinda v. Texaco, in LITIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE V. PERILS (Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
International Affairs ed., 2000). 
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The article identifies, finally, how NGOs not only use interventions in domestic and foreign 
courts to attempt to embed particular models of religious rights; they do so in part through 
arguments based on comparative reasoning. Those who invoke “foreign” norms infuse their own 
meaning into these norms.17 We shall see that there appears to have been an increase in 
interventions by religious rights’ organizations using comparative reasoning in two ways: first, in 
other countries’ courts using comparative arguments drawn from their own countries, and 
second, by organizations intervening in their own countries’ courts, using comparative 
arguments drawn from other countries. The article identifies a symbiotic relationship between 
the phenomena of NGO participation in religious litigation at home and abroad, and the use of 
comparative arguments in that litigation. The elements of globalization and catch-up have 
combined to encourage the use by religiously affiliated NGOs of foreign legal materials in 
litigation. The game of catch-up has involved not only catching up in playing the domestic 
litigation game in the first place, but also catching up in how to play it. However unlikely it 
might have seemed some years ago, the greater involvement of NGOs on both sides of 
transnational litigation may be leading to the routinization of the use of comparative 
jurisprudence, at least in the context of religious litigation, even in the United States.  
 
2. NGOs and the development of human rights 
In their path-breaking work, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink defined networks as “forms of 
organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication 
and exchange.”18 One form of network they particularly emphasized was what they described as 
“transnational advocacy networks,” which they identified as including “those relevant actors 
working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.” NGOs, defined by Benjamin 
Stachursky as “private, voluntary, nonprofit, nonviolent groups with formal institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The reception by foreign judges of Brown v. Board of Education bears this out in a striking way, see Sheldon 
Bernard Lyke, Brown Abroad: An Empirical Analysis of Foreign Judicial Citation and the Metaphor of 
Cosmopolitan Conversation, (2012) 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 83. 
18  MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8 (1998). 
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character and aiming at some form of social change,”19 play a particularly important role in these 
networks.  
NGOs, with and without a religious background or orientation, have long played an 
important political role in the development of human rights law relating to religion. There is now 
extensive scholarly work demonstrating convincingly that transnational advocacy networks 
comprising NGOs have played a significant role in lobbying for human rights in general, and 
influencing the content of particular human rights covenants, both generally and as regards the 
protections for freedom of religion.20 Several NGOs with a strong religious background and 
commitment continue to play a significant role beyond this “legislative” development of the law. 
Their role in monitoring human rights abuses is also well-documented,21 including the role they 
play in advocating a religion-friendly interpretation of human rights in international and regional 
organizations.22 Academic studies have identified for some years an emerging relationship 
between religious organizations in the United States and the international human rights 
movement.23 In that context, Bob has described a continuous and continuing war of attrition 
between conservative religious and progressive secular NGOs for influence over policy making 
across a wide swath of issues.24 In particular, a strategy has been developed of seeking to ensure 
that soft-law standards developed by one side are met by soft-law standards developed on the 
other side, in order to attempt to disrupt the hardening of the soft-law instruments into hard law 
by showing them not to reflect a settled consensus.25 
 
3. NGOs and domestic religious litigation 
There is growing evidence, however, that the legislative and political role of these organizations 
is now being supplemented by an additional role: the initiation and conduct of, or participation 
in, litigation at the domestic level and beyond. Non-governmental organizations play a prominent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 STACHURSKY, supra note 13, at 46. 
20 ROBERT TRAER, FAITH IN HUMAN RIGHTS: SUPPORT IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FOR A GLOBAL STRUGGLE (1991). 
21 ALLEN D. HERTZKE, FREEING GOD’S CHILDREN: THE UNLIKELY ALLIANCE FOR GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2004). 
22 See, e.g., NORWEGIAN AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, LOBBYING FOR FAITH AND FAMILY: A STUDY 
OF RELIGIOUS NGOS AT THE UNITED NATIONS (2013); Lucian Leustean, Representing Religion in the European 
Union: A Typology of Actors, 12(3) POL., RELIGION & IDEOLOGY 295 (2011).  
23 Lowell W. Livezey, US Religious Organizations and the International Human Rights Movement, 11(1) HUM. RTS 
Q. 14 (1989). 
24 BOB, supra note 3, ch. 3. 
25 For example, the stand off between the Yogyakarta Principles and the Doha Declaration, which overlap and 
contradict each other on issues of sexual orientation: see BOB, supra note 3, at 62. 
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role in religious litigation on both sides of these human rights conflicts. Yet their role and the 
role of the transnational advocacy networks of which they are a part, has attracted little attention 
in so far as their transnational activities are concerned. Rachel Cichowski has suggested that, 
while some scholars “point to the increasingly integral role that advocacy groups play in 
developing and connecting local to global governance . . . we know far less about their role in 
international litigation—a very powerful process at the global level that shapes both domestic 
and international law.”26 I shall turn to consider these transnational activities subsequently, but 
fully to understand the transnational developments, we need first to consider NGO litigation 
activity at the domestic level. 
A comparative examination of the role of NGOs and transnational advocacy networks in 
religious litigation in all domestic jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, 
examples drawn from a limited set of jurisdictions27 will be provided to support the general 
proposition that their involvement in religious litigation, and the techniques of involvement that 
they have used, is an important phenomenon. The NGOs identified are a heterogeneous group. 
Some are local, while others are transnational. Some are “conservative” in their approach to 
issues of law and religion, while others are “liberal” (terms that will require some further 
explanation subsequently). Some are specialist NGOs, meaning that they concentrate on issues of 
law and religion to the exclusion of other human rights issues, while others are generalist, 
viewing law and religion issues as only part (and possibly a relatively minor part) of the menu of 
issues with which they engage. Some are established on an ad hoc basis, simply focusing on the 
particular case or issue before the court with no aim to be involved in the longer term, while 
others have been involved in human rights issues for some considerable time.  
Some NGOs are significantly focused on litigation as their primary modus operandi, while 
others see litigation as only one of a menu of other techniques that may be used to secure their 
objectives. Although NGOs may also fulfill other less traditional roles in their dealings with 
courts,28 among those NGOs that consider using litigation, the formal role of NGOs in human 
rights litigation involving religious issues is evident in three ways: by taking cases in their own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Rachel A. Cichowski, Courts, Advocacy Groups, and Human Rights in Europe, in THE POLITICS OF THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF LAW: GETTING FROM RIGHTS TO JUSTICE 107, 109 (Alison Brysk ed., 2013). 
27 The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Convention on Human Rights, Uganda, and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. 
28 Heidi Nichols Haddad, Judicial Institution Builders: NGOs and International Human Rights Courts, 11 J. HUM. 
RTS. 126, 131 (2012).  
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name; by financially supporting litigation taken by others or providing support in kind; and by 
intervening as an amicus curiae (or equivalent) in cases in which the NGO is not involved either 
as a party itself or in directly supporting one of the parties. This developing role in litigation is 
neither surprising nor unique to the world of religious rights litigation. One of the more 
important developments in human rights litigation more generally is the increasing role that 
NGOs play in initiating and sustaining such cases, but there is a relative dearth of information on 
(and transparency about) this phenomenon. However, the use of amicus curiae mechanisms or 
other cognate modes of intervention is a visible manifestation of this NGO involvement and it 
appears to be growing in importance.29  
The United States provides one of the best-developed examples of the NGOs’ involvement in 
religious litigation. Litigation specifically by religious groups30 is not a new development in the 
United States. 31  Much of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence was 
prompted by active litigation by two minority religious groups, Seventh Day Adventists and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.32 There has also been longstanding activity by groups that want greater 
separation of church and state, such as Americans United for Separation of Church and State. 
The present activity by NGOs differs in two respects from what has gone before: in the sheer 
number of groups now involved, and in the broad swath of social policy issues that they now find 
themselves litigating. 
 Two recent examples of this phenomenon must suffice. In Lawrence v. Texas,33 the case in 
which the United States Supreme Court decided that state laws criminalizing sodomy was 
unconstitutional under federal law, thirty-one amicus briefs were submitted to the Supreme 
Court, some in favor of upholding the criminalization of sodomy as constitutional (sixteen) and 
some against (fifteen). There was a diverse set of interests represented, including, as Paul Collins 
has noted, “religious organizations (e.g. Agudath Israel of America), public interest law firms 
(e.g. Institute for Justice), medical societies (e.g. the American Public Health Association), 
public policy organizations (e.g. Centre for Arizona Policy), academics, members of Congress, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Anna Dolidze, Anglo-Saxonizing Rights: Transnational Public Interest Litigation in Europe, ASIL PROCEEDINGS 
47, 48 (2011), refers to it as “the elephant in the room” that “deserves more attention.”  
30 For a discussion of the variety of religious NGOs, see Julian Berger, Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: 
An Exploratory Analysis, 14(1) VOLUNTAS 15 (2003). 
31 A study in 1981 found that the earliest example dated from 1925, see Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church–State 
Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 83, 83 (1981). 
32 FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE (1976). I 
am grateful to Cole Durham for this reference. 
33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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and U.S. states.”34 In Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC,35 the Supreme Court held in a unanimous 
decision that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses barred suits, brought on behalf of 
ministers against their churches, claiming termination in violation of employment discrimination 
laws. The respondent was a minister within the meaning of the “ministerial exception,” a 
judicially devised restriction on the coverage of the employment laws. Twenty amicus briefs 
supporting the application of the ministerial exception were filed. 
Although there are few, if any, jurisdictions with so extensive a system of civil society 
organizations involved in religious litigation as in the United States, a similar trend appears to be 
emerging in several other countries.36 Courts and legal procedures outside the United States are 
in the process of adopting an understanding of NGOs in the human rights field that mirrors the 
general welcome that NGOs are given in US courts, although the pattern of activity will vary 
depending on several factors such as differing cultural preferences for operating via NGOs, the 
extent to which litigation is central to political debate, the ease with which NGOs are able to 
identify relevant cases in which to intervene in a timely manner,37 and technical court rules 
determining access to courts to by organizations.38  
In Canada, there is a history beginning in the 1980s of “interfaith” coalitions intervening in 
some of the major court cases in which religious rights and freedoms were at issue, initially on 
the issue of abortion,39 then increasingly on issues around sexual orientation,40 for which a 
coalition of the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (representing some thirty or so Protestant 
churches) and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops came together with national 
associations of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims in order to intervene in the litigation. Such 
interventions go beyond abortion and sexual orientation. In Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,41 in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether Canadian law required the private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 PAUL M. COLLINS, FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT 166 (2008). 
35 Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
36 In addition to those countries discussed below, see 27(1) S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. (Special Issue: Public Interest 
Litigation in South Africa) (2011). 
37 For example, improvements in the ECtHR’s website have made it easier to pick up on cases in time for NGO 
response. 
38 The openness to amicus input varies depending on rules. The US has fairly easy access, as spelled out in Rule 37 
of the Supreme Court Rules in the U.S. Supreme Court. The ECtHR is becoming more flexible in allowing 
interventions, but the policy is more restrictive 
39 Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342. 
40  Egan and Nesbit v. Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Barbeau v. British Columbia (A.G.), 2003 BCCA 406; 
Halpern v. Canada [2003] O.J. 2268; Marriage Reference re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698. 
41 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 S.C.C. 47. 
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company running an apartment block to permit Jewish resident to erect a succah on their 
balcony, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Canada, 
and the World Sikh Organization of Canada all intervened. 
The involvement in religious litigation of NGOs at the domestic level in some other 
European jurisdictions, such as in the British domestic context, is also apparent. In some cases, 
there are extensive interventions by third parties, a procedure partly popularized by human rights 
NGOs in the 1990s.42 In Jivraj v. Hashwani,43 a case dealing with the legality of specifying the 
religion of international commercial arbitrators, the London Court of International Arbitration, 
the International Chamber of Commerce, and His Highness Prince Aga Khan Shia Imami Ismaili 
International Conciliation and Arbitration Board intervened. In JFS,44 a case challenging a 
Jewish school’s refusal to admit a pupil on the ground that he was not Jewish under the Orthodox 
Jewish definition, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, United Synagogue, Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, and 
British Humanist Association were all represented in the Supreme Court. In other cases, similar 
organizations are the named parties. In the Christian Institute case,45 there was an application for 
judicial review of the making of regulations prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation by seven organizations: the Christian Institute, the Reformed Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland, the Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Ireland, the Congregational Union of Ireland, the 
Association of Baptist Churches in Ireland, the Fellowship of Independent Methodist Churches, 
and the Christian Camping International (UK) Limited.  
 
4. NGOs and transnational religious litigation 
Thus far, we have focused attention on the involvement of NGOs primarily based in the 
jurisdictions concerned. This pattern is now undergoing significant change, in two respects. First, 
NGOs based in one jurisdiction, and seeing themselves as primarily interested in issues within 
that jurisdiction, are nevertheless increasingly intervening in jurisdictions other than their own. 
Second, many more organizations have been established that consider themselves to have global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See Sarah Hannett, Third Party Intervention: In the Public Interest?, PUBLIC L. 128 (2003), and Mona Arshi and 
Colm O’Cinneide, Third-party Interventions: The Public Interest Reaffirmed, PUBLIC L. 69 (2004).  
43 Jivraj v. Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40. 
44 R(E) v. Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15. 
45 Christian Institute & Ors, Re Judicial Review [2007] NIQB 66. 
	   11	  
scope and interests, even though they may have a seat in one jurisdiction or another.46 
Organizations such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty fall into this second category. One of 
the features of globalization is that many human rights and religious NGOs are genuinely global 
in scope, and these NGOs litigate globally.47 
Interventions by both these types of NGOs in religious litigation appear to be on the increase 
due to a combination of political and legal reasons. One reason is that human rights NGOs, 
particularly of the second type, have frequently adopted an understanding of constitutional and 
human rights that is universalist and cosmopolitan in orientation and this has the effect of 
encouraging a view that violations of rights in one country are as much the NGO’s business as 
violations in any other country. A second reason, relevant more to the first group of NGOs, is an 
acceptance of the fact that globalization means that what happens in another country may well 
directly or indirectly affect developments in the NGO’s own country—a favorable decision in 
one jurisdiction may “cascade,”48 influencing developments in other jurisdictions, and then 
globally. A third element in the story, again particularly relevant for the first group, is that one 
way of appealing to their domestic audience is for domestic NGOs to intervene in litigation in 
foreign courts against policies and practices that are particularly unpopular in the NGOs’ home 
jurisdiction.  
Regional human rights courts,49 in particular the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
have proven particularly important forums for these purposes,50 and a similar pattern of NGO 
participation in international and transnational religious litigation to that seen in domestic 
litigation has been apparent for some time, and on similar issues. In the Lautsi litigation before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The numbers are contested, but Ruth Reetan, A Global Civil Society in a World Polity, or Angels and Nomads 
Against Empire?, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 445, 445 (2007) notes that between 1973 and 1993, “transnational 
social movement organizations concerned with human rights, the environment, peace and development more than 
tripled in number, reaching to over 600 organizations.” 
47 United Nations-based human rights representatives have also intervened in US litigation. See, e.g., Brief of 
Professor Juan E. Mendez U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture as Amicus Curiae on Reargument in Support of 
Petitioners in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). See also Brief of the European 
Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party. 
48 See KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD 
POLITICS (2011). 
49  Only one of several fora available, see Jonathan Graubart, “Legalizing” Politics, “Politicizing” Law: 
Transnational Activism and International Law, 41 INT’L POL. 319 (2004). 
50 See LA TIERCE. INTERVENTION DEVANT LA COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROIT DE L’HOMME (Emmanuel 
Decaux & Christophe Pettiti eds., 2008).  
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the ECtHR,51 for example, in which the Court considered whether Italian public schools could 
keep the crucifix despite objections by a parent, leave to intervene was given to thirty-three 
members of the European Parliament acting collectively, and to several non-governmental 
organizations. As well as expressing their views on issues of religious freedom, interveners in 
cases before the ECtHR have been particularly prominent in cases concerning abortion and the 
right to life, and sexual orientation. In A, B and C v. Ireland,52 considering Ireland’s ban on 
abortion, numerous third party submissions were received.53 In X v. Austria,54 a case claiming the 
right of same-sex couples to adopt, joint third-party comments were received on behalf of six 
non-governmental organizations. Third-party comments were also received from (among others) 
the European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ) (which also intervened in Lautsi), and Alliance 
Defending Freedom (ADF), which had each been given leave to intervene in the written 
procedure.  
 
5. Advantages of NGO participation 
In several of these examples, the preferred method of involvement chosen by the NGO was to 
submit its views to the domestic or regional court in the form of an amicus brief (in the United 
States cases) or as an intervener (in the United Kingdom and the ECtHR). There are clear 
advantages for NGOs, and for the courts themselves, in making interventions in this way. 
For NGOs, it is a relatively55 cheap method of demonstrating to their audience and supporters 
their continuing engagement at the cutting edge of legal debates. To the extent that NGOs are 
involved in high profile cases, they are likely to be able to generate press interest about their role 
and that results in publicity and additional funding. NGO participation in litigation is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, (2012) 54 EHRR 3. 
52 A, B and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, (2011) 53 EHRR 13.  
53 From the European Centre for Law and Justice in association with MEP Kathy Sinnott, the Family Research 
Council (of Washington, DC) and the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (of London); from the Pro-Life 
Campaign; joint observations from Doctors for Choice (based in Ireland) and the British Pregnancy Advisory 
Service (of London); and joint observations from the Center for Reproductive Rights (headquartered in New York) 
and the International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Program (based at the University of Toronto). 
54 X v. Austria, App. No. 19010/07, (2013) 57 EHRR 14. 
55 Relatively cheap. Unless the lawyers preparing these briefs are working pro bono, the costs can still be extensive. 
One relatively recent estimate (2004) put the cost of preparing an amicus brief before the United States Supreme 
Court at around US$50,000. See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, 20 J. L. & POL. 33, 58 (2004). Wealthier organizations are more likely to file such briefs than less wealthy 
groups, see Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 315, 331 (2008). 
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necessarily based on a short-term desire to win, therefore; being seen to take part is often an 
advantage in itself,56 quite apart from any longer term strategic games that they may be 
playing.57 NGOs calculate that intervening in this way also means that they are more likely to 
ensure that their views will find their way to the judges and have some greater prospect of 
influencing the judge than activity on the margins of the litigation would have. Particularly 
where judges are burdened with a heavy case load (the ECtHR is the obvious example) and the 
prospects of judges reading material that is not directly before the court therefore seems slim, 
such interventions are likely to appear the best (sometimes the only) way of influencing the 
court. 
Nevertheless, for the courts too, there are also potential advantages,58 if the process of NGO 
involvement is handled carefully.59 Human rights cases frequently involve profoundly difficult 
questions of fact and law, morality, and politics, often in circumstances in which the court is 
confronted with the issues for the first time.60 For courts that draw on ideas of regional or 
international consensus to interpret human rights norms, interveners may help the court identify 
whether such a consensus exists, and provide information of legal approaches adopted in other 
legal systems.61 Particularly in litigation before regional courts and international bodies, the case 
will arise in one political, cultural, and religious setting, which may be quite different elsewhere. 
The pleadings submitted by the parties may give no real insight concerning the case’s 
implications for other countries. Ideally, NGOs can help to prompt the court to appreciate a 
broader range of considerations that the case involves than the parties themselves may be able or 
willing to provide. NGO involvement can also bring to the court specialized expertise on 
particular issues to help resolve the issues before the court. And, finally, the court may consider 
that NGOs provide a greater degree of “popular” participation in the litigation than if they were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 55, at 318–20. 
57 JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 
(2004). 
58 But see, e.g., the objections to amicus curiae by Judge Posner in Voices for Choice v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 
339 F.3d 542, 644 (7th Cir. 2003). 
59 See, e.g., In re Certain Amicus Curiae Applications: Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign 
and Others, 2002 (5) SA 713 (CC), ¶ 5. See also Haddad, supra note 28, at 143 (by providing help to a resource-
limited court). 
60 In Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, (2007) 44 EHRR 5, the ECtHR was making decisions with 
extremely broad ramifications on the basis of very little information, and in particular, without the extensive amicus 
contributions that are typical in comparable cases in the US. That is part of what led to the creation of the Strasbourg 
Consortium. 
61 Ludovic Hennebel, Le role des amici curiae devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, 71 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 641, 658 (2007). 
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not there, and increased participation of this type may itself help to increase the quality of the 
deliberative process.62  
We should not rush to conclude, however, that such interventions have influence with judges. 
The question of influence is problematic. The empirical evidence is scanty and contested,63 and 
few sustained studies appear to have been conducted outside the United States attempting to 
estimate the effect of such interventions in courts.64 But the United States experience tends to 
support a conclusion that such interventions can be influential, at least in part, some of the 
time.65 If they are influential in the United States and in other courts, then we should know more 
about these groups: how they operate, what they seek, and when they intervene.  
 
6. Development of US religious NGOs 
Although some scholars have discussed transnational litigation of this type as the result of the 
global nature of activist networks, it is a noticeable feature of religious transnational litigation 
that it is, in the main, American conservative NGOs which are at the forefront of this 
development. As Clayton Fordahl has argued, “the ‘global’ networks seem to be constituted 
almost entirely by American actors, resources and ideologies.”66 The remainder of this article 
thus focuses primarily on interventions by US religious groups in litigation,67 not least because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See, e.g., Baroness Hale, Who Guards the Guardians, Speech at Public Law Project Conference (2013), available 
at http://www.publiclawproject.org.uk/data/resources/144/PLP_conference_Lady_Hale_address.pdf. I am 
grateful to Ben Jaffe for drawing this to my attention. 
63 Haddad, supra note 28, at 130, describing the “mixed” results of research attempting to identify the impact of 
NGO participation as third parties on courts. 
64 Although see Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial 
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611 (1994), finding a positive correlation between third part interventions and a 
violation, but contrast Laura van der Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights 
NGOs Before the European Court of Human Rights, 31(3) NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 292 (2013), 
questioning this finding. ALAN PATTERSON, THE LAST LAW LORDS AND THE SUPREME COURT (2013) gives 
examples of when individual justices in the apex UK court have reported that interventions have been decisive in 
both reasoning and outcome. I am grateful to Ben Jaffe for this reference. 
65 The empirical evidence is mostly confined to the United States, see, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 34, at 116; Lynch, 
supra note 55, at 34. See also R. Reeves Anderson & Anthony J. Franze, Commentary: The Court’s Increasing 
Reliance on Amicus Curiae in the Past Term, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 24, 2011); R. Reeves Anderson & Anthony J. 
Franze, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Amicus Curiae in the 2011–12 Term, NAT’L L. J. (Sept. 24, 2012); R. 
Reeves Anderson & Anthony J. Franze, The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Amicus Curiae in the 2012–13 Term, 
NAT’L L. J. (Sept. 18, 2013). 
66 Clayton Fordahl, Book Review: Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics, 57 ACTA 
SOCIOLOGICA 95 (2014). 
67  For a discussion of secular NGOs in religious litigation, see Michael Roan, The Role of Secular Non-
Governmental Organizations in the Cultivation and Understanding of Religious Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 135 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds.,1996). 
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such interventions appear to be increasing. NGOs are frequently on both sides of these issues, 
but the growing involvement of religious NGOs in religious litigation appears to be generated by 
the growing number of NGOs on what, for the moment, I shall term the “conservative” side of 
the political divide, particularly in the United States. 
There are at least three factors explaining their growing involvement in courts. First, 
conservative religious groups have been increasing willing to enter the political fray, a tendency 
which is characteristic of a more general trend among conservative groups in the United States, 
and litigation is often seen as a natural extension of political campaigning. Second, other groups 
with which religious groups share something of an overlapping set of concerns -- such as 
conservative legal networks not involved in religiously-related issues -- have increasingly turned 
to the courts in pursuit of their goals. Third, and most importantly, religious groups consider that 
they have been forced into a litigious posture because secular NGO’s (e.g., the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and American’s United for Separation of Church and State) have been 
effective in using litigation to pursue their agendas.  
The growth of a US “conservative” legal network forms the backdrop to the development of 
a US “conservative” religious legal network. Several recent studies have set out in convincing 
detail how groups were established since the 1970s, and particularly during the Reagan and Bush 
presidencies, to counter the ability of “liberal” legal groups to change the direction of US law in 
a more liberal direction, including in such areas as racial equality, personal privacy, women’s 
rights, criminal justice, voting reform, and reproductive rights.68 Steven Teles has shown how, 
having failed to translate electoral victory (such as the election of Ronald Reagan) into effective 
political change, in part because of the perceived liberal bias in the courts, foundations and 
groups promoting conservative ideas built a network designed to dislodge legal liberalism from 
American elite institutions, such as elite law schools and the judiciary. Conservative legal 
advocacy groups were established to emulate their liberal antagonists, using similar tactics.  
Rather than seeing this conservative movement as homogeneous, it is more accurate to view 
the networks of “lawyers from the right” as a loose coalition comprising: religious and social 
conservatives -- particularly interested in opposing social change in areas such as abortion and 
gay rights --; libertarians and affirmative action opponents particularly interested in reducing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See esp. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF 
THE LAW (2008). For earlier studies, see LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT (1985); Karen O’Connor & Lee 
Epstein, The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Litigation, 45 J. POL. 479 (1983). 
	   16	  
governmentally sponsored or required social engineering such as in areas of racial equality; and 
laissez faire liberals particularly interested in pursuing economic policies that reduced 
government intervention in the market and were favorable to business interests.69 These different 
interests shared a relatively small number of goals, such as opposition to “judicial activism,”70 
but differed on many others, such as what role individual autonomy and choice should play, and 
how far the state should actively pursue goals such as social and racial justice.71 On the basis of 
extensive interviewing of the lawyers involved, Southworth concluded that “lawyers for the 
constituencies that compose the conservative movement are fundamentally divided . . . 
fundamental class and cultural differences tend to separate these lawyers and their organizations 
along the lines of the constituencies they represent.”72 Studies dating to the 1990s have identified 
religious organizations as sufficiently separable from other groups to warrant separate analysis.73 
Even within each of these broad policy orientations (such as that comprising “religious 
organizations”) there are also significant differences. As the number of such groups has 
increased, and as “their leaders struggled to compete in the market for patrons, credit, and 
influence,”74 groups have attempted to identify how they differ from other groups in terms of the 
subject areas on which they focus and the strategies and tactics they use. Thus, within the broad 
area of conservative religious organizations, some focus on opposing pornography while others 
advocate home schooling; some will be primarily Catholic and others will be Evangelical 
Christians; some will target Congress while others focus on the courts. The most prominent 
groups that have focused significantly on the courts include the Alliance Defense Fund, the 
American Center for Law and Justice, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the Christian Legal 
Society, and the Rutherford Institute.75 (This is not to say that all religiously affiliated or 
religiously committed organizations support “conservative” positions.76) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008). 
70 Id. at 106–110. 
71 Id. at 103–106. 
72 Id. at 64, 65 
73 Gregg Ivers, Religious Organizations as Constitutional Litigants, 25 POLITY 243 (1992). 
74 SOUTHWORTH, supra note 69, at 30. 
75 For a detailed analysis, see STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE 
SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS (2002), esp. chapter 3, One in Purpose. 
76 In Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), for example, a brief was filed by a group of (primarily) Jewish 
organizations opposing the ban on partial-birth abortions. The Catholic Church has worked with NGOs opposing 
capital punishment and supporting gun control, and opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. 
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The picture is complicated in two further respects. First, various organized religions have 
played significant roles directly, rather than relying on less directly connected NGOs to represent 
their positions before the courts. The legal staff of the United States National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops has played a significant role, for example, and much the same could be said 
about lawyers for the Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty. The Religious Liberty 
Committee of the National Council of Churches, which has a history of bringing experts together 
from all sides, has been a significant clearinghouse for alerting religious groups and others to 
emerging issues. The American Jewish Committee and the now defunct American Jewish 
Congress have also been significant players. Second, and relatively unnoticed, American law 
schools have become involved in religious litigation through temporary networks of professors 
with fluid memberships, who come together to submit briefs, particularly to the US Supreme 
Court. These professors are sometimes supported in their submissions by human rights clinics 
based in the Law Schools, which focus on human rights cases as part of the law students’ clinical 
legal education.77 Until recently, these human rights clinics have been involved in cases on the 
liberal or progressive side. There are signs that this too may be changing. In what follows, all 
these groups will be included as NGOs, although several may strenuously object to be so 
designated. 
In the United States, the involvement of NGOs in religious litigation appears to be growing, 
partly because the number of NGOs is growing and each needs to set itself apart from the others 
in a crowded field. Involvement in litigation may be a useful way of doing so. The growing 
involvement of such NGOs also has much to do with the growing centrality of American courts 
in deciding hot-button issues in American political life, particularly those that involve contested 
issues of the relationship between law and morals. The United States has for some time been 
experiencing increasingly bitter political standoffs between “liberal” and “conservative” political 
forces, and this has been particularly evident in controversies on issues such as abortion, same-
sex marriage, healthcare, gun control, capital punishment, affirmative action, the treatment of 
immigrants, the issue of torture in the interrogation of suspected terrorists, and the role of 
religion in public life, to name but a few of the more contentious issues. All of these issues have 
ended up before the federal judiciary. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See Deena R Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 505 (2003). 
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Those involved in intervening in religious litigation differ ideologically, organizationally, 
and strategically and they largely proceed independently in the actions they pursued. Although 
they differ, NGOs that are involved primarily on one of these issues, taking a conservative 
position on abortion, say, identify NGOs that take a “conservative” position on other issues in 
this list (say, health care) as potential allies. We see a broad coalition of “conservative” groups 
coalescing around an issue that at first sight seems far from the concerns of some members of the 
group (say, an anti-abortion group and an anti-gun control group both filing amicus briefs 
opposing same-sex marriage). This development is not confined to the conservative side of the 
political divide, with the same phenomenon occurring among “liberal” groups, and seems to be a 
clear indication of the importance of “acculturation,”78 with single-issue groups becoming 
acculturated to a liberal or conservative position on other issues as a result of tactically useful 
close involvement with the broader conservative or liberal movement. Precisely because of 
differences of agendas, networks tend to take the form of informal coalitions. Where they happen 
to coincide, for example when they participate in the same litigation by filing amicus briefs, 
there is a tendency to avoid “open conflict.”79 Those involved understand that shared values on 
one issue may not carry over to other issues of concern. However, open and cordial relations 
make it at least easy to check with others to determine whether there are shared interests on 
particular issues.  
In light of this discussion, the broad-brush distinction drawn above between “liberal” and 
“conservative” is not a particularly well chosen, and may well be misleading if the 
characterization is thought to indicate that interventions are intended to pursue a Republican or 
Democratic political agenda. It is, unfortunately, almost impossible not to use the 
liberal/conservative distinction, given how pervasive it is in current American political discourse, 
but many of those who advocate for religious freedom issues do not think they are pursuing a 
“conservative” agenda. They view themselves as pro-religious freedom, and pro-human rights in 
general. A better characterization, perhaps, is to view the controversies as ones within 
constitutional and human rights law, arising from the clash of human rights, especially the clash 
between freedom of religion, association and speech on the one hand (attracting “conservative” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78  See RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013), in which the concept of “acculturation” is analyzed in the context of decision-making 
by states. 
79 SOUTHWORTH, supra note 69, at 153. 
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support), and non-discrimination, equality or personal autonomy norms on the other (attracting 
“liberal” support). In the context of this article, therefore, the terms “conservative” and “liberal” 
have specialized meanings, indicating broadly different orientations on which rights should have 
priority, and how particular rights should be interpreted. 
 
7. US religious groups and transnational litigation in Europe 
Although they share a broad set of common values, in several respects US conservative religious 
groups have developed tactics that diverge from other conservative groups. One tactic of 
religiously based US organizations has been to seek to intervene in litigation at the national level 
in other countries. Three examples illustrate this development. First, the European Centre for 
Law and Justice, which was established as the European arm of the American Center for Law 
and Justice, has intervened in litigation before the Slovak Constitutional Court challenging a law 
permitting abortion up to twelve weeks, at the request of the pregnant woman.80 Second, the 
American-based groups Advocates International and the Alliance Defense Fund were involved in 
supporting Pastor Åke Green in resisting criminal conviction in Sweden for a sermon that was 
alleged to be homophobic. This support included submitting (apparently influential81) amicus 
briefs to the Swedish Supreme Court on his behalf, an initiative that was joined by several other 
foreign interveners, including the Becket Fund, the Family Research Council, Focus on the 
Family, the (Canadian) Christian Legal Fellowship, and the (British) Jubilee Campaign.82 Third, 
in Romania, when the Constitutional Court was petitioned to validate a referendum seeking to 
constitutionalize a ban on same-sex marriage, ADF filed a brief supporting a local NGO (the 
Alliance of Romania’s Families, modeled on equivalent American NGOs).83 The brief argued 
that the proposed amendment was constitutional, drawing in part on European Union law. This 
was countered by a brief from another local NGO, ACCEPT, also with overseas backing, citing 
international standards as prohibiting the proposed amendment.84  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 European Centre for Law and Justice, Interest of Amici Curiae, Submitted to the Constitutional Court of the 
Slovak Republic, PL. ÚS 12/01. The Court upheld the law as constitutional, PL. ÚS 12/01, No. 1/2007. 
81 BOB, supra note 3, at 89. 
82 Id. at 86. 
83 Id. at 101. 
84 Id. at 100–101. 
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NGOs originating in the US environment seek to have US understandings of how NGOs 
operate transplanted into their new local environment.85 Technical rules governing access, in 
particular the development of amicus curiae interventions, have been developed by US-based 
NGOs in several of these cases to enable them to be given greater access than those foreign 
courts would usually accord.86 
After Lawrence,87 a particular target for interventions has been the ECtHR. The largest group 
of NGOs active before the Court is based in the United Kingdom, but the second largest group of 
NGOs comes from the United States, including several that are law school clinics,88 and a 
significant proportion of that group of American NGOs is made up of religious conservative 
groups.89 In the ECtHR, the European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ)90 and the Alliance 
Defense Fund (now renamed Alliance Defending Freedom, ADF),91 are particularly evident,92 
but the Becket Fund,93 American United for Life,94 the International Center for Law and Religion 
Studies of Brigham Young University,95 and the Family Research Council96 have all intervened. 
This is at first sight surprising given that these NGOs are frequently hostile to the use of 
comparative arguments in the United States courts, betraying a deep skepticism towards 
internationalist, universalist and cosmopolitan arguments. Indeed, in the United States, such 
groups not infrequently rail against the use of “foreign” jurisprudence as anti-American. Why, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 What has been termed “Anglo-Saxonizing rights,” see Anna Dolidze, Anglo-Saxonizing Rights: Transnational 
Public Interest Litigation in Europe, ASIL PROCEEDINGS 47 (2011). For a related argument, see Benedict 
Kingsbury, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the 
Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 183, 185 (2002). 
86 BOB, supra note 3, at 86 and 100 (referring to developments in Sweden and Romania).  
87 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
88 Van de Eynde, supra note 64, at 287–288 (noting the appearance of “conservative” groups as interveners before 
the ECtHR, but all those identified are faith-based groups. 
89 Id.  at 283. 
90 See, e.g., Sindivatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, App. No. 2330/09, 9 July 2013; SH v. Austria, App. No. 
57813/00, (2011) 31 B.H.R.C. 443; Koch v. Germany, App. No. 497/09, (2013) 56 EHRR 6; Gross v. Switzerland, 
App. No. 67810/10, (2013) 35 BHRC 187; X v. Austria, (2013) 57 EHRR 14; A, B and C, (2011) 53 EHRR 13; 
Lautsi, (2012) 54 EHRR 3; Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10, (2013) 57 EHRR 8. 
91 Gross, (2013) 35 BHRC 187; Koch, (2013) 56 EHRR 6 (third-party comments were received from Aktion 
Lebensrecht für alle e. V. (AlfA), an association based in Germany, represented by the Alliance Defense Fund); X v. 
Austria, (2013) 57 EHRR 14. 
92 Van de Eynde, supra note 64, at 287–288, has described them as the “two most prominent” conservative NGOs 
before the court. 
93 Sindivatul, App. No. 2330/09. 
94 Gross, (2013) 35 BHRC 187. 
95 Sindivatul, App. No. 2330/09. 
96 A, B and C, (2011) 53 EHRR 13. 
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then, are they to be found to be a significant presence in European religious litigation, and 
particularly in the ECtHR?  
Their involvement abroad is linked to the split between conservative and liberal justices on 
the Supreme Court concerning the utility, persuasiveness and appropriateness of relying on 
foreign precedents. Bob quotes the chief counsel of ADF, Benjamin Bull, as explaining the 
apparent contradiction: “We’re forced to do it, because if we don’t, we’re going to lose 
according to rules of a game we never created.”97 In Lawrence, over strident dissents, the 
majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court partially relied on ECtHR jurisprudence to 
find unconstitutional the criminalization of sodomy under state law.98 Since Lawrence, US-based 
conservative NGOs see European decisions as potentially undermining their position in US 
courts. Some US NGOs thus litigate in Europe partly in the hope of staving off decisions that 
may come back to haunt them when similar issues are litigated in the US. As Bob put it, their 
objectives are, preemptively, to forge “overseas law into something less dangerous, more 
ambiguous, or downright helpful.”99 Interventions seem partly to be based on the idea that, 
following Lawrence, one way of instantiating a particular model of accommodation with 
resurgent religion in the United States is therefore to ensure “favorable” decisions by the ECHR.  
One “conservative” reaction to Lawrence, therefore, has been to carry the fight into the 
“enemy’s” camp. It is noteworthy that the ECLJ was established by the American Center for 
Law and Justice precisely in order to establish such precedents in the ECtHR. It is not alone. 
When ADF was granted permission to intervene in the Eweida case,100 its President and General 
Counsel described it as a “remarkable opportunity . . . to stand in defense of religious freedom … 
in cases that—if they are decided the wrong way—could have a negative impact on your 
religious liberty here in the United States.”101 However, the context in which these remarks were 
made means that too much significance should not be read into them. Such statements may be 
motivated in part by the need to make such interventions relevant to funding and volunteer 
service constituencies in the United States. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 BOB, supra note 3, at 83. 
98 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
99 BOB, supra note 3, at 83. 
100 Eweida, (2013) 57 EHRR 8. 
101  Alan E. Sears, ADF Granted Right to Defend Four Crucial Cases, available at 
http://www.alliancealert.org/2011/08/23/alan-e-sears-adf-granted-right-to-defend-four-crucial-cases/. 
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There are several characteristics of these US-based interventions in European cases that 
reflect the US origins of the organizations involved. First, there is a tendency for interventions to 
occur in types of issues that have already given rise to debates in the United States, or are 
considered likely to generate such debates in the near future; areas of settled law in the United 
States context, or issues that seem to arise from what might be called “European 
exceptionalism,” are unlikely to attract interventions.102 Second, there is a tendency to formulate 
issues and generate legal theories that map onto US conceptual thinking, particularly 
constitutional thinking, a consequence of unwitting American legal parochialism; there is more 
likelihood, for example, that bright-line conceptual categories will be advocated in US-
influenced interventions than in European-based interventions that veer more towards 
proportionality reasoning. Third, US-based interventions appear more likely to cite United States 
Supreme Court judgments than opinions from any other jurisdiction, with the effect that the 
European courts may over time be more exposed to US jurisprudence than that from any other 
single jurisdiction. This is no doubt a reflection of what American lawyers know best,103 but the 
United States remains one of the most sophisticated jurisdictions dealing with complex rights 
disputes, so it is perhaps not so surprising.  
As regards the substance of interventions before the ECtHR, American religious conservative 
interventions are also likely, in general, to follow US conservative approaches that are evident 
when these organizations intervene in US litigation: one opposed to what would be perceived to 
be judicial activism, and in favor of the preservation of national sovereignty.104 The Lautsi 
case105 is a paradigm example, with US-based interventions consistently arguing that the Court 
should apply the “margin of appreciation” in such a way as to give substantial freedom to Italy to 
decide whether or not to permit or require crucifixes to be displayed in public schools.  
However, to regard American religious conservative interventions in United States courts or 
in the European courts as simply reflecting hostility to judicial activism and favoring national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 The Chief Counsel of ADF, Benjamin Bull, told BOB, supra note 3, at 84, that ADF selects cases using several 
criteria: “Does the case have potential to adversely impact American jurisprudence?  Does the case have potential to 
positively influence events in the States?  Is the case of significance locally; has it made the media; is it precedent 
setting.” 
103 Tarrow has referred to transnational advocates as “rooted cosmopolitans” in SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW 
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2005), at 2. 
104 In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), for example, the Amici Curiae brief of the American Center for Law and 
Justice, the European Centre for Law and Justice, and the Slavic Centre for Law & Justice was concerned to curb 
attempts to incorporate a particular reading of international law into domestic law. 
105 Lautsi, [2012] 54 EHRR 3.. 
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sovereignty would be to miss an equally important element in US-based interventions in 
religious litigation, whether from conservative or liberal sources: that they reflect a commitment 
to a particular set of normative understandings of human rights and of the role of religion in 
public life. Underestimating the depth of this normative commitment contributes to a view that 
all that is going on in these interventions is the expression of a rather crude national or 
organizational self-interest. Self-interest does not fully explain the approach taken, one in which 
those intervening are interested in persuading the court that a particular approach is right 
(morally and legally). Religious NGOs are concerned about what they regard as moral issues that 
are being eroded by global tides of opinion. They no longer see these issues as merely national, 
therefore, but rather as issues that need to be confronted globally. 
The courts in which they intervene are often urged to adopt a stance that would involve 
actively developing the law, and in ways that would significantly depart from the positions that 
US courts have upheld. Indeed, in many of the cases involved, there is no settled American 
consensus to convey. Southworth recounts how, in one of the interviews she conducted, a 
“Christian who had litigated religious liberties claims in the European Court of Human Rights 
said, ‘[I]n Europe, it’s like the Marshall Court of 1810. We’re at the very early formative stages, 
and so there is a lot of excitement. We can write the road map in this area in Europe.’”106 
 
8. US religious groups and transnational litigation beyond Europe 
Interventions by transnational NGOs have, so far, been relatively uncontroversial in the 
European context. Where such interventions occur outside Europe, however, this has proven 
more controversial, because it has raised accusations of neo-colonialism that feature much less 
prominently in the European context. A common pattern of NGO involvement appears to be 
evolving. Initially, local progressive groups become involved in a particular jurisdiction to 
reform an aspect of domestic policy or practice, often using the local courts as part of their 
reform strategy. These efforts are frequently supported by arguments drawing on international 
law and precedents from other jurisdictions, as well as material and other support from 
progressive human rights groups outside the jurisdiction. This, in turn, results in those opposing 
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these changes arguing that those advocating change are not only wrong in principle, but that such 
changes only come about as a result of objectionable outside interference.  
The current controversy surrounding the criminalization of sodomy is a prime example. 
Although not entirely restricted to states with a history of British colonial rule, these states have 
proven particularly attracted to criminalization.107 At least since the decision of the ECtHR in 
Dudgeon,108 attempting to have such crimes struck down has become an important aspect of the 
work of groups campaigning in favor of gay rights, often using international law to argue that 
such legislation is illegitimate.109 A good example of this is the successful campaign to ensure 
that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights would decide that criminalization was contrary 
to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.110 This case attracted interventions from 
influential lawyers drawing on European human rights law,111 which the Inter-American Court 
largely adopted. In India, a similar strategy also led initially to a successful outcome for gay 
rights campaigners, with the Delhi High Court holding that criminalizing sodomy was contrary 
to the Indian Constitution,112 only to see that judgment itself overturned by the Indian Supreme 
Court.113 
These actions have, however, led to a counter-reaction, based partly on opposition to change 
on the basis of principle, but also objecting to what local conservative groups have characterized 
as a transnational attempt to undermine domestic decisions on issues of morality that are more 
appropriately left to national decision-making processes. We thus see in several countries 
attempts to restrict the activities of NGOs, particular foreign-based NGOs, operating in this field. 
It is unclear how much such developments are part of larger anti-foreign pressures -- legislation 
aimed at limiting the influence of civil society organizations or restricting foreign funding of 
non-commercial organizations is evident in several places for reasons that seem unconnected to 
the types of religious controversies we are concerned with in this article.114 The most high profile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THIS ALIEN LEGACY: THE ORIGINS OF “SODOMY” LAWS IN BRITISH COLONIALISM 
(2008). 
108 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, (A/59) (1983) 5 EHRR 573. 
109 Notably, the Human Dignity Trust, based in London, which has supported legal cases challenging the 
criminalization of sodomy in Belize (before the domestic Belize courts), in Northern Cyprus (before the ECtHR), 
and in Jamaica (before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). See http://www.humandignitytrust.org/. 
110 Atala Riffo v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts, Feb. 24, 2012 (Merits). 
111 See written report of expert witness: Professor Robert Warren Wintemute, Sept. 12, 2011, and the subsequent 
questioning at the oral hearing. 
112 Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, High Court of Delhi, 2 July 2009. 
113 Suresh Kumar Koushal and others v. Naz Foundation and others, S. Ct. of India, Dec. 11, 2013. 
114 Ethiopia, for example, has adopted legislation that restricts funding of NGOs. 
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examples of states seeking to restrict foreign NGOs, however, have been presented as arising 
from gay rights activities. Recent developments in Russia and Uganda are the most controversial 
examples of this development. Russia’s law prohibiting “gay propaganda”115 is echoed by the 
decision of the Ugandan parliament not only to introduce draconian legislation criminalizing 
“any form of sexual relations between persons of the same sex,” but also to criminalize “the 
promotion or recognition” of homosexual relations “through or with the support of any 
government entity in Uganda or any other nongovernmental organization inside or outside the 
country.”116 
Another effect, however, is that, partly in reaction to the intervention by liberal transnational 
NGOs, conservative religious groups, many from the United States, not infrequently come in to 
support local conservative forces. Having lost the constitutional battle at home to preserve the 
criminalization of sodomy in Lawrence, these US conservative religious groups have turned their 
attention to other places where equivalent issues are under consideration.117 This has resulted in 
interventions at the legislative and policy levels in several developing countries, 118  most 
controversially in Uganda, where US-based conservatives have been criticized as partly 
responsible for the passage of the legislation just mentioned.119 Indeed, these interventions have 
themselves given rise to transnational litigation, back in the United States. The US-based Centre 
for Constitutional Rights has sued Scott Lively, the president of Abiding Truth Ministries, and 
the former state director of the American Family Association, in US federal court, on behalf of 
Sexual Minorities Uganda, a group based in Uganda. The suit claimed that Mr. Lively’s 
activities in Uganda are contrary to the Alien Tort Claims Act in collaborating with government 
officials in the deprivation of the fundamental rights of Ugandan homosexuals.120 
There is often, therefore, significant foreign support for local actors on both sides of 
religiously engaged litigation. We thus increasingly see a standoff occurring, between the local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Miriam Elder, Russia Passes Law Banning Gay “Propaganda”, THE GUARDIAN, June 11, 2013. 
116 Alan Cowell, Ugandan Lawmakers Pass Measure Imposing Harsh Penalties on Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2013. 
117 Strange Bedfellows; The War on Gays, THE ECONOMIST, May 4, 2013, at 61–62. See also Max Fisher, From 
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119 For a discussion of these themes, see BOB, supra note 3, at 49–53. 
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progressive actors and local conservative groups, but also between transnational progressive and 
transnational conservative groups. Conservative and liberal transnational NGOs are facing each 
other in the Caribbean, for example, in the case of Orozco v. Attorney General of Belize, in 
which the Human Dignity Trust, the International Commission of Jurists, and the 
Commonwealth Lawyers Association are supporting a local gay rights activist, Caleb Orozco, 
the head of United Belize Advocacy Movement, in challenging the constitutionality of the Belize 
criminal code which criminalizes consensual sexual conduct between adults of the same sex. The 
case has potential importance beyond Belize, as similar laws are under scrutiny across the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. They are opposed by a coalition named Church Interested Parties, 
which includes the local Catholic Church in Belize, the Belize Church of England Corporate 
Body and the local Evangelical Association of Churches. In addition, there is a local umbrella 
group, Belize Action, which also supports the existing law. The issue of outside interventions (on 
both sides) has been mired in controversy, with criticisms of the Human Dignity Trust for 
appearing to take over the Orozco’s case.121 On the other side, the Southern Poverty Law Center 
reported that Belize Action is partly funded by Alliance Defending Freedom, a US-based 
religious NGO,122 a report that an American pastor associated with Belize Action has denied,123 
while accepting that Alliance Defending Freedom has provided advice, legal assistance and 
strategy.  
 
9. US religious groups and the use of international and foreign law in US courts 
As well as distinguishing themselves from other US conservative groups by engaging in 
transnational litigation in Europe and the developing world, US religious groups are also 
beginning, however tentatively, to take advantage of their position as emerging transnational 
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religious conservative “norm entrepreneurs,” 124  by feeding particular interpretations of 
international and foreign law back into the American courts.  
To those who observe NGOs’ role in litigation in other countries, this is hardly surprising. 
The supply of comparative arguments by such interveners appears to be a primary method in 
which the courts receive such information.125 This is significantly on the increase, taking 
advantage of (or, as we have seen, sometimes creating) procedure in different courts that allow 
for interveners or amicus curiae arguments to be presented to appellate courts. The increased use 
of such arguments in the ECtHR, for example, dates from the changes in the Court’s rules of 
procedure in the early 1980s, which permitted interventions.  
One of the ways in which these actors make themselves particularly useful to such courts is 
by bringing an explicitly comparative approach to bear in their arguments. Indeed, one of the 
main roles of NGOs is to provide comparative argumentation,126 and it is thus not surprising that 
US conservative religious groups have done the same when intervening in these foreign courts. 
For example, in Eweida,127 a number of interveners (including the European Centre for Law and 
Justice and the Alliance Defense Fund) introduced the concept of “reasonable accommodation.” 
The Alliance Defense Fund drew the Court’s attention to jurisprudence from the United States, 
which required reasonable accommodation of religious beliefs and practices, insofar as that 
accommodation did not cause “undue hardship” to the employer.  
That such groups have also drawn on comparative arguments in the United States is, 
however, much more noteworthy. We have seen that in the United States, the reference by the 
Supreme Court in the Lawrence case128 to ECtHR jurisprudence contributed to the strong 
reaction among conservative commentators against the use of international and comparative 
materials by the United States’ courts. The issue of judicial borrowing has, indeed, become 
another key indicator of one’s position in the continuing battle between conservatives and 	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on state or foreign law” (emphasis added). Haddad, supra note 28, at 139 reported interviews with “long-standing 
court officials” at the ECtHR describing how “the only situation where NGO briefs can have an impact is when they 
provide well-researched comparative law.” See also Cichowski, Courts, Advocacy Groups, and Human Rights in 
Europe, supra note 25, at 119 (on effects in particular cases in the ECtHR). 
127 Eweida, (2013) 57 EHRR 8. 
128 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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liberals. In general, conservatives are heavily against transnational judicial borrowing; liberals 
appear in general more supportive. This has resulted in comparative arguments advanced before 
the United States Supreme Court coming overwhelmingly from those with a liberal agenda.129 It 
has become something of an article of faith in conservative legal networks that the use of such 
materials is to be opposed and that conservatives should not themselves refer to such materials 
when they intervene in cases, except to criticize their use by others.130  
Given this, it is therefore of some significance that in major cases before the US Supreme 
Court in recent years, lawyers closely connected to “conservative” religious groups have 
intervened in order to bring foreign and international materials to the attention of the US 
Supreme Court in a way that has significantly departed from previous “conservative” opposition 
to the use of such arguments. Although highly controversial within conservative circles, these 
groups have attempted to try to beat the liberals at their own game by providing US courts with 
comparative materials that support their “conservative” position. The relevance of foreign law 
for swing Justices (notably Kennedy J) heightens the importance of such interventions.  
Particularly following Lawrence,131 and adopting tactics very similar to those used by groups 
supporting gay rights in Lawrence, some religious conservative groups have therefore intervened 
in US courts using comparative arguments, particularly citing ECtHR jurisprudence to illustrate 
that there is no consensus about how to treat the issue before the Supreme Court. In Gonzales v. 
Oregon,132 for example, the amicus curiae brief of the International Task Force on Euthanasia 
and Assisted Suicide argued that international standards of medical practice rejected the 
provision of drugs for the purpose of induced death. Throughout most of the world, it argued, 
assisted suicide and euthanasia are considered profound violations of medical ethics, drawing 
attention to the fact that when it decided an assisted-suicide case, the ECtHR found that its 
policies “did not confer any claim on an individual to require a State to permit or facilitate his or 
her death.”133 In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,134 counsel for amicus 
curiae the University Faculty for Life in support of the petitioner was Richard G. Wilkins, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 See, e.g., Brief of amici curiae Human Rights Advocates, and ors, in Support of Respondents in Fisher v. 
University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), arguing that “consideration of race in admissions decisions to 
universities is consistent with the United States’ treaty obligations as well as international practice.” 
130 A good illustration is Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
131 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
132 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
133 Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
134 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
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Professor of Law and Managing Director of the World Family Policy Center at Brigham Young 
University, a Mormon supported university. Their Brief argued that: 
Unlike other questions, for which a strong consensus exists, resort to international law 
regarding abortion provides little guidance for this Court. To the extent such guidance 
does exist, it supports the right of parents to be involved in the care and treatment of 
their daughters, and thus supports the petitioner in this case. 
In the US Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor,135 the International Centre for Law and 
Religious Studies, also at Brigham Young University, filed a brief in support of the petitioners, 
drawing extensively on European and other foreign jurisprudence in favor of protecting the 
religious freedom of the church involved. One of the challenges in such cases is to draw on 
comparative materials in ways that stress the general persuasiveness of foreign precedents 
without suggesting that by relying on the authority, the Supreme Court should abdicate to foreign 
rule. Thus, although the Brief in Hosanna-Tabor acknowledged that Church-state relations in the 
United States “differed in many ways from those in much of the world” it went on to argue that it 
“is, therefore, striking to note the degree to which other countries, representing a wide range of 
church-state systems, have nonetheless recognized the need for an equivalent to the United 
States’ ministerial exception, which protects religious organizations’ ability to select, supervise, 
discipline, and remove leaders, teachers, and others who have ministerial functions.”136 Foreign 
jurisdictions had “repeatedly recognized how essential autonomy is to religious freedom,” and 
cited approvingly how the ECtHR had described the autonomy of religious organizations as 
‘indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and . . . an issue at the very heart of the 
protection [of religious freedom].’”137  
In Hollingworth v. Perry,138 same-sex couples who had been denied marriage licenses 
brought a civil rights action against the Governor of California and other state and local officials. 
They argued that California’s Proposition 8, a voter-enacted ballot initiative that amended the 
California Constitution to provide only marriage between a man and a woman, thereby 
eliminating the right of same-sex couples to marry, violated their rights to due process and equal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Hosanna Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
136 The Brief cited as examples cases from the ECtHR, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and the German Federal 
Court of Justice in Civil Matters (Mar. 28, 2003, BGHZ 154, 306, 315). 
137 See also the Brief of Amicus Curiae Advocates International in Support of Petitioner, Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010). 
138 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.139 The amicus curiae 
brief of the American Civil Rights Union in support of Hollingsworth distinguished between the 
prohibition of same-sex acts by the state (which the Brief accepted, after Lawrence, was 
unconstitutional), from a requirement that same-sex marriage be held to be constitutionally 
required.140 The Brief adopted the position that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR was of some 
importance to the issue before the Court in this respect. In what seemed like a coordinated move, 
amicus curiae briefs were also submitted in Perry to a similar effect by a group of International 
Jurists and Academics,141 by Judge Georg Ress (formerly of the European Court of Human 
Rights), and by the Marriage Law Foundation. Even the Brief of the Petitioners drew on the 
ECtHR’s practice to support their argument that “Our Constitution does not take this sensitive, 
controversial social issue out of the hands of the People themselves”, citing approvingly an 
ECtHR decision, in which it declined to “rush to substitute its own judgment in place of that of 
the national authorities,” holding instead that the right to marry in the Convention does not 
require Council of Europe member nations to redefine marriage in the absence of a “European 
consensus regarding same-sex marriage.”142  
In the Hobby Lobby case, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 2014,143 we can see 
a similar pattern. This case concerned the constitutional limits on Congressional power arising 
from controversial healthcare reforms. The issue, simplified, was whether requirements on for-
profit employers included in the health insurance scheme to provide certain types of treatment 
under that scheme, including contraception, was constitutional. The argument against its 
constitutionality was that the requirement breached the religious freedom guaranteed by the First 
Amendment, unless an employer with religious objections to providing such treatment, was able 
to gain an exemption from that requirement. As in Perry, the International Centre for Law and 
Religion Studies at Brigham Young University filed an amicus brief on behalf of a group of 
academic institutions and comparative law and religion scholars in support of the employer, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 The Supreme Court held by a majority of 5 to 4 that proponents did not have standing to appeal district court’s 
order declaring the Proposition unconstitutional. 
140 It contrasted Dudgeon, (1983) 5 EHRR 573 (criminalizing homosexual conduct violates the ECHR), with Schalk 
and Kopf v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, (2011) 53 EHRR 20 (ECHR does not require members to extend 
traditional marriage to same-sex relationships). 
141 Professor W. Cole Durham of the J, Reuben Clark Law School was Counsel of Record, and the group consisted, 
among others, of four former members of national apex courts in Italy, Slovakia, and the UK, two former judges of 
the ECtHR, and a former judge of the CJEU. 
142 Quoting Schalk, (2011) 53 EHRR 20. 
143 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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drawing extensively on comparative and international law.144 On the other side, against the 
employer, was an amicus brief by Lawrence Gostin of Georgetown University Law Centre and 
four other legal academics also drawing on international and comparative law.145 
Religious groups that otherwise follow a broad conservative political agenda in other respects 
are, therefore, willing to break ranks on the use of international and comparative law, confirming 
that the “conservative” movement is much less monolithic than it might appear to be. 
Southworth has identified a clear difference within “conservative” understandings of legal 
interpretation, contrasting conservatives “who emphasize national sovereignty and democratic 
accountability,”146 with those from a conservative religious perspective who draw on a natural 
law and natural rights approach. For the latter, developments in other legal systems could and 
should be drawn on as a manifestation of practical reason playing out in ways that are relevant to 
US judicial decision-making. She quotes the Becket Fund, for example, as asserting that 
religious freedom is “a basic human right that no government may lawfully deny; it is not a gift 
of the state, but instead is rooted in the inherent dignity of the human person.”147 Such a position 
is more sympathetic to arguments drawn from international human rights law.  
The human rights story that is being told, however, is an increasingly complicated one in this 
respect. In both the ECtHR and the United States Supreme Court, we can observe a somewhat 
similar development in the citation of international and comparative law in religious litigation—
resort to such sources is increasingly occurring on both sides of contested issues, with each side 
attempting to contest the other’s efforts. Indeed, at the level of the contending parties and their 
supporters, it is becoming usual to attempt to head off the use of such sources by the other side. 
In Ladele,148 for example, extensive arguments were made on both sides on how to interpret the 
comparative material on conscientious objection. So too, in Perry, detailed briefs on the issue of 
foreign law were submitted in support of both sides. One brief pointing to “the international 
trend towards equal marriage rights for same-sex couples” was filed by a transnational coalition 
composing the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination (based in the United 
States), Liberty (in the UK), the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (in Canada), the Legal 
Resources Centre (in South Africa), and the Center for Legal and Social Studies (in Argentina). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Brief of Amicus Curiae, W Cole Durham, Counsel of Record. 
145 Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts. 
146 SOUTHWORTH, supra note 69, at 174. 
147 Id. at 175. 
148 Ladele was one of the four cases reported under the name: Eweida (2013) 57 EHRR 8. 
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A second brief, by Professors Harold Koh, Sarah Cleveland, Laurence Helfer and Ryan 
Goodman, also argued that there was an increasing trend towards the recognition of same sex 
marriage. The latter was developed as a direct result and in response to the international and 
comparative arguments first submitted by the petitioners and several NGOs supporting them.149  
Indeed, there seems to be a strategy emerging in these cases which views the absence of an 
argument based on these materials as more potentially dangerous than the presence of such 
arguments, because it may indicate to the Court that the use of such materials by the other side 
cannot be rebutted. We are now in the interesting situation where the use of such materials may 
be becoming “normalized” to a degree that would have seemed surprising (at least in the United 
States) even a decade ago. International and comparative norm internalization by way of 
emulation appears to be operating at least at the level of the parties, even if no equivalent 
development has emerged at the level of the court. Indeed, this strategy may be adopted not in 
order to persuade the respective court that the preferred interpretation of these materials should 
be adopted by the court, but as a spoiler of what the other side has presented. Success may be 
measured by stopping the court from citing the other side’s use of this material. If so, then in 
both Ladele,150 Hollingsworth,151 and Hobby Lobby,152 this spoiler tactic worked; it is noticeable 
that despite the extensive set of arguments based on international and comparative materials on 
both sides in these cases, the relevant Court did not advert to these arguments in either case, thus 
supporting Bob’s suggestion that one of the outcomes of (and sometimes the intention behind) 
such clashes between ideological rivals is non-policy making.153 
 
10. Some normative implications 
The aim of this article has been to produce a thick description rather than a normative analysis, 
but it is legitimate to ask how far NGO interventions of the type we have been considering are 
acceptable on normative grounds. On one reading, the separate elements of this phenomenon 
(NGOs actively involved beyond the borders of the state in which they are situated; NGOs 
engaging in litigation; religious issues raising human rights questions; conservative groups 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts Harold Hongju Koh, Sarah H. Cleveland, Laurence R. Helfer, 
and Ryan Goodman as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Feb. 28, 2013, No. 12-144. 
150 Eweida (2013) 57 EHRR 8. 
151 Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). 
152 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).. 
153 BOB, supra note 3, at 6, 32. 
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adopting the tactics of liberals), even when taken together, raise no new normative issues. These 
groups have simply combined together already existing elements, each of which is broadly 
legitimate, to produce the phenomenon described. The phenomenon is no more than the sum of 
its parts, and no more normatively problematic that each of its parts taken separately. Those who 
object to such NGO interventions are likely to be driven by similar ideological objections as 
have been raised about international human rights in general, such as an objection based on the 
prime importance of retaining national sovereignty. Such arguments are increasingly heard from 
both the left and the right of the political spectrum. This normative position is then simply 
applied to the phenomenon described, and we can assess the validity of the argument in that 
context in the same way as we assess its validity in the other contexts in which it arises. There is 
nothing new. 
There is, however, an alternative reading, in which bringing together these elements into the 
phenomenon described does, indeed, raise additional normative issues that go beyond existing 
debates. Just as the confluence of different streams into a river may produce something of a 
different character to the streams taken separately, so too (goes the argument), taken together 
these separate strands amount to more than the sum of their parts and are normatively 
problematic in this form. How, more precisely, might this phenomenon gives rise to new 
normative issues?  
We have seen that interventions by NGOs have sometimes led to European courts 
(combining European domestic and European regional courts together, for the moment) adapting 
themselves institutionally and becoming more like the “public law” litigation forums beloved of 
liberals and reformers in the heyday of pubic interest litigation in the United States. Such 
institutional changes are undoubtedly likely to lead to significant changes in the power dynamics 
that currently exist between national governments and the courts. There is, however, little 
prospect that such external interventions will significantly destabilize the dominant pluralistic 
view of the relationship between religion and the state, and they have not in fact done so. In the 
European context, the effect of such interventions as those described are likely to affect human 
rights developments only at the margins, and primarily at the level of institutional power 
relationships. The normative questions engaged relate primarily to the desirability of the shifts in 
power relations. The fact that they arise from outside the state itself does bring a new element 
into that debate, but it is unlikely to generate much angst because the external interventions fall 
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clearly within the parameters of internal domestic debates on these issues. And we have seen 
that, in fact, these interventions have generated little controversy. 
Were such interventions seriously to challenge existing European values, and to stand any 
real chance of succeeding in doing so, it might be a different story. At this point, we can 
introduce the other dimension of foreign NGO involvement, that which goes beyond 
interventions in Europe and engages directly in intervening in other parts of the world, such as in 
Uganda. In these contexts, there are objections to what is seen as a sustained attempt to lay the 
foundations for an alternative conception of rights, seen by some as an anti-Enlightenment view 
of the world, in circumstances where an Enlightenment view is still far from having been fully 
instantiated. Conservative religious groups have identified an important vacuum in the 
ideological underpinnings of human rights there and have sought to fill that space with their own 
preferred values, and to do this through the courts. In this context, their agenda is partly 
institutional, relating to power relations within the state, but also significantly value-based. And 
all this in a context where the judicial institutions are weak, only semi-independent, and starved 
of resources. What we see, according to critics, is an attempt to re-write the human rights culture 
in the image of the interveners. That is seen as concerning, not least because it shows real signs 
of succeeding in some contexts. 
What might be done about this is another matter, however, and the approach adopted must 
blend arguments of principle and prudence. I suggest that we should think of foreign NGO 
involvement in litigation within the paradigms of freedom of speech and freedom of association. 
This would lead to several possible strands of argument, many of which would support the 
NGOs freedom to intervene, but some of which might also lead to restrictions on such 
involvement. Thus, for example, if we think of the issue of human rights interventions before 
courts as one closely approximating the issue of political lobbying, we might support some 
restrictions. We are sometimes willing to support restrictions on freedom of association because 
we are suspicious of well-financed interest groups dominating the political process and driving 
out poorer groups, hence the regulation of campaign financing. We might think of the 
phenomenon described in this article as closely akin to foreign lobbying of the political process 
and be willing to consider introducing regulatory constraints similar to those applying in that 
context. Increasingly, states have been concerned at foreign-dominated political lobbying and 
have introduced transparency requirements, such as a requirement to register, declare foreign 
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involvement, and disclose sources of funding. At the moment, few, if any of these types of 
requirements apply to foreign “lobbying” in the judicial process, but should they? 
At one level, it is hard to resist calls for greater transparency or limiting the role in courts of 
foreign organizations that have simply bought such access, but the problem is that, in some 
circumstances, requiring transparency or limiting the role of foreign financial subventions will 
act as a severe disincentive to groups participating in judicial intervention to support preferred 
values. Requiring pro-democracy groups to disclose that they are partly funded by foreign 
government sources, for example, could have severe consequences for those involved with such 
groups, including in some countries the threat of violence and death.154 These restrictions will 
surely be used by repressive regimes to justify their own attempts to suppress dissent.  
What we seem to be left with, to return to the free speech analogy, is a normative conclusion 
that encourages more speech rather than restricting existing speech. Those concerned with 
foreign NGO involvement, whether in Europe or elsewhere, and whether of the left or the right, 
should seek to counter their influence, if they object to their involvement, by ensuring that they 
are at least aware that such activity is occurring (and in that context it is surprising that this 
article is, so far as I am aware, the first in the legal literature to map the extent of this practice), 
and ensuring that an equally well-funded voice is present on each occasion that can respond with 
sophistication and authority to such interventions. 
154 Analogous to Southern states in the US requiring civil rights groups, such as the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), to register and disclose membership lists as a way of suppressing their 
activities, a tactic subsequently struck down by the US Supreme Court, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
